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     NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 06-4814
VIRGINIA MAE GINTER;
ANDREW FRANCIS GINTER, her husband,
v.
MICHAEL P. SKAHILL, Trooper;
THE OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF DELAWARE COUNTY;
THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE DEPARTMENT
Virginia Mae Ginter,
     Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
D.C. Civil Action No. 04-cv-2444
(Honorable U.S. Magistrate Judge M. Faith Angell)
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 8, 2008
Before:  SCIRICA, Chief Judge, McKEE and SMITH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed:  October 28, 2008)
OPINION OF THE COURT
2SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
Virginia Mae Ginter appeals the grant of summary judgment in her civil action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending her arrest for possession of a controlled substance,
manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia,
violated her constitutional rights.  We will affirm.
I.
On August 17, 2001, while patrolling by helicopter, Trooper Michael Skahill and
another trooper observed a field with suspected marijuana plants adjacent to the residence
of Virginia and Andrew Ginter.  The troopers landed and inspected the field, finding
plants later confirmed to be marijuana.  Andrew Ginter was on his back porch and the
troopers approached him;  Virginia Ginter was not at the residence.
Responding to the troopers’ questions, Andrew Ginter indicated he had licensed
firearms in his vehicle and in his residence.  He invited the troopers into his home while
he retrieved the guns from the house.  The troopers observed in the family room, in plain
view, a vial with suspected marijuana residues next to a suspected marijuana pipe.  Then,
while guns were being retrieved from Andrew’s vehicle, Trooper Skahill observed
aluminum facia and rat poison in the truck.  Andrew claimed the items were for home
improvement and displayed a Lowe’s receipt for these items to the troopers.
The troopers then proceeded along a small path between the Ginters’ yard and the
marijuana field.  While removing the suspected marijuana plants from the field, the
3troopers observed plants had been uprooted and wrapped in aluminum facia secured with
electrical tape.  Rat poison was scattered about the field and a Lowe’s bag, containing
additional rat poison, was also found in the field.  The troopers then departed. Some hours
later, Virginia returned home at the same time the police were returning Andrew’s
firearms.
On October 1, 2001, after verifying the items listed on the Lowe’s receipt were the
same as those observed in the marijuana field, Trooper Skahill spoke with an Assistant
District Attorney to ascertain if there was sufficient probable cause to arrest Andrew
Ginter.  The Assistant District Attorney believed there was, and Trooper Skahill
subsequently obtained a warrant for Andrew Ginter’s arrest on charges of possession of a
controlled substance, manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance, and possession of
drug paraphernalia.  
On November 29, 2001, after learning Virginia Ginter co-owned the Ginter
residence, the Assistant District Attorney confirmed there was also probable cause for
Virginia Ginter’s arrest.  Subsequently, Trooper Skahill obtained a warrant to arrest 
Virginia Ginter on charges of possession of a controlled substance, manufacture or
delivery of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
Andrew Ginter pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver a controlled
substance on June 10, 2002.  On June 27, 2002, the charges against Virginia Ginter were
withdrawn. On June 4, 2004, Andrew and Virginia Ginter filed a civil complaint under 42
     The original complaint named three defendants: Trooper Michael P. Skahill, the1
Office of the District Attorney of Delaware County, and the Pennsylvania State Police
Department. The Pennsylvania State Police Department moved to dismiss the complaint.
The Court granted its motion on August 4, 2004.  
     With the consent of all parties, on October 4, 2005, this matter was referred to United2
States Magistrate Judge M. Faith Angel for all further proceedings and the entry of
judgement. 
     This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “Our review of the District3
Court’s grant of summary judgment is plenary and ‘we must grant all reasonable
inferences from the evidence to the non-moving party.’” Sanford v. Stiles, 456 F.3d 298,
303 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Knabe v. Boury Corp., 114 F.3d 407, 410 n.4 (3d Cir.
1997)).
4
U.S.C. § 1983. They contended their constitutional rights had been violated, alleging false
arrest and malicious prosecution.   The District Attorney’s office and Trooper Skahill1
moved for summary judgment, and the District Court granted the motion on October 17,
2006.   Only Virginia Ginter appeals this decision.  2 3
II.
A.
In her appeal, Ginter only contends the District Court erred in finding there was
probable cause to support her arrest. (Br. for Appellant, 7).  Before addressing the merits
of this argument, we must first address the timeliness of Ginter’s claims. Section 1983
claims are subject to the state’s statute of limitations for personal-injury torts.  Owens v.
Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1989).  Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations for personal
injury actions is two years.  Garvin v. City of Philadelphia, 354 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir.
2003) (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(7)).  When false arrest is the basis of the §
51983 action, the statute of limitations normally begins to run at the time of arrest.
Montgomery v. DeSimone, 159 F.3d 120, 126 (3d Cir. 1998).   Claims alleging malicious
prosecution do not accrue until charges are dismissed.  Smith v. Holtz, 87 F.3d 108, 111
(3d Cir. 1996).  Accordingly, Ginter’s false-arrest claims are time barred  because more
than two years elapsed between her arrest date, December 12, 2001, and the date the
complaint was filed, June 4, 2004.  Ginter’s malicious prosecution claims are not time
barred because they were filed on June 4, 2004, within two years of June 27, 2002, the
date the charges against her were dismissed.
B.
Ginter contends the District Court erred in finding her arrest supported by probable
cause. To bring a claim of malicious prosecution,“a party . . . must demonstrate that (1)
the defendants initiated a criminal proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in the
plaintiff's favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause; and (4) the
defendants acted maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the plaintiff to justice.”
Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 579-80 (3d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). “A claim of
malicious prosecution brought under section 1983 . . . alleges the abuse of the judicial
process by government agents.” Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 225 (3d Cir.
1998).  Ginter contends Trooper Skahill did not have probable cause to obtain a warrant
for her arrest because she was neither at her residence during the search, nor did she own
the lot containing the marijuana plants. 
6“[A] district court may conclude ‘that probable cause did exist as a matter of law if
the evidence, viewed most favorably to the Plaintiff, reasonably would not support a
contrary factual finding,’ and may enter summary judgment accordingly.”  Estate of Smith
v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 514 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).  But “a plaintiff cannot
resist a properly supported motion for summary judgment merely by restating the
allegations of his complaint, but must point to concrete evidence in the record that
supports each and every essential element of the case.” Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71
F.3d 480, 484 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). 
Thus, we look to the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine
whether probable cause did exist. “[P]robable cause to arrest exists when the facts and
circumstances within the arresting officer’s knowledge are sufficient in themselves to
warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been or is being committed by
the person to be arrested.”  Id. at 483.   Accordingly, “[P]robable cause does not require
the same type of specific evidence of each element of the offense as would be needed to
support a conviction.”  Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972). 
Defendant’s Affidavit of Probable Cause for Ginter referenced three crimes:
possession of a controlled substance, manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance,
and possession of drug paraphernalia. (A-26-27).  Under the Pennsylvania Crimes Code,
Section 780-113(a)(16), (30), and (32), these crimes are defined as:
(16) Knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled substance . . .
7(30) . . . manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or
deliver, a controlled substance . . . 
(32) The use of, or possession with intent to use, drug paraphernalia for the
purpose of . . . introducing into the human body a controlled substance in
violation of this act.
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (30), (32)
Ginter did not physically possess the marijuana plants or drug paraphernalia, but probable
cause may still be established through constructive possession.  
In Pennsylvania, constructive possession is “the ability to exercise a conscious
dominion over the illegal substance: the power to control the contraband and the intent to
exercise that control.”  Commonwealth v. Macolino, 469 A.2d 132, 134 (Pa. 1983).  In
Macolino, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held “constructive possession can be found in
one defendant when both the husband and wife have equal access to an area where the
illegal substance or contraband is found.”  Id. at 135.  Ownership of a residence is “an
important factor in establishing dominion or control over the contraband [found in the
residence].”  Jackson v. Byrd, 105 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 1997).
Virginia Ginter does not contest she co-owned and resided at the Ginter residence.
A reasonable person would assume if she lived at the residence, she would have equal
access, power and control over the common areas of the house where the drug residue,
receipt and paraphernalia were found.  As stated in Orsatti, probable cause to arrest is
legally sufficient when a “reasonable person” would believe “an offense has been or is
being committed by the person to be arrested.” 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 2003). “The
8proper inquiry in a section 1983 claim based on . . . misuse of the criminal process is not
whether the person arrested in fact committed the offense, but whether the arresting
officers had probable cause to believe the person arrested had committed the offense.”
Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d 136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988).  
Trooper Skahill had probable cause to believe Ginter possessed the drug
paraphernalia and residue because it was found in the family room, a common area of the
residence she co-owned and lived in with her husband.  Likewise, although the issue is
closer, Skahill had probable cause to believe Ginter possessed the plants on the adjacent
lot because a receipt was found in the common area of the Ginter residence linking the
items found in the lot with the Ginters.  These facts were sufficient to cause a reasonable
person to believe Virginia Ginter constructively possessed both the plants and
paraphernalia. Moreover, Ginter does not point to any affirmative evidence to reasonably
support a contrary finding as required under Orsatti.  Accordingly, Ginter’s constitutional
rights were not violated.
In the alternative, even if Ginter had established a violation of her constitutional
rights, Skahill would be entitled to a defense of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity
protects government officials from liability if their actions do not “violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.” Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 484. Even if a constitutional right was violated, the officer is
still entitled to qualified immunity if “the officer’s mistake as to what the law requires is
9reasonable.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001). Qualified immunity, furthermore,
is determined under a standard of objective reasonableness. Orsatti, 71 F.3d at 484. 
Skahill spoke with an Assistant District Attorney before filing his affidavit for Ginter’s
warrant. (A-35). He was deliberate in acting in accordance with the law. From an
objective view, his actions corresponded with the legal advice he received from the
Assistant District Attorney.  Accordingly, Skahill is entitled to qualified immunity. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
